

Susan K. Snyder

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Professional experience

Department of Economics, Brown University
2003-2004 Visiting Assistant Professor
2002-2003 Visiting Scholar

Department of Economics, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
1995-2003 Assistant Professor

Education

Ph.D. (Economics) Stanford University, 1996.

B.S. (Economics and Mathematics) Carnegie Mellon University, 1989.

Research and teaching interests

Public Economics, Microeconomic Theory, Political Economy

Research

Articles in refereed journals

“Equilibrium Behavior in Markets and Games: Testing and Identification” (with Andrés Carvajal and Indrajit Ray), *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 2004, 40:1-40.

“Observable Implications of Equilibrium Behavior on Finite Data,” *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 2004, 40: 165-176.

“The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB” (with Barry R. Weingast), *The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 2000, 16:269-305.

“Nonparametric Testable Restrictions of Household Behavior,” *Southern Economic Journal*, 2000, 67: 171-185.

“Testable Restrictions of Pareto Optimal Public Good Provision,” *Journal of Public Economics*, 1999, 71:97-119.

Other publications

“Scientific Progress and Lessons for Institutional Design: Comments on “A Toy Model of Scientific Progress” by Susanne Lohmann,” *The American Journal of Economics and Sociology*, 2004, 63:183-187 (reprinted in *The Production and Diffusion of Public Choice Political Economy: Reflections on the VPI Center*, ed Joseph C. Pitt, Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Douglas W. Eckel, Blackwell: Malden, Mass, 2004).

“On Rationalization of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior from Observed Outcomes” (with Indrajit Ray), *Arthaniti*, 2003, 2:62-78.

Working papers

“Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games” (with Indrajit Ray), January 2003. Brown University Economics Department Working Paper 2003-02. Submitted to *Games and Economic Behavior*.

“Empirical Consistency of Equilibrium Models,” March 2001, Virginia Tech Working Paper E00-04.

“Testable Restrictions of General Equilibrium Theory,” September 1995. Virginia Tech Working Paper E95-31.

Work in progress

“Expressive Contributions and Interest Group Incentives.”

“Testable Restrictions of Games in a Semi-Algebraic Framework.”

“Redistribution of Rights and the Time-Consistency Problem: The Passage of the Married Women’s Property Acts.”

Conference presentations (selected)

“Observable Implications of Nash and Subgame-Perfect Behavior in Extensive Games.”
North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 2004; International Conference on Public Economic Theory, 2003.

“Observable Implications of Equilibrium Behavior on Finite Data.”
Midwest Economic Theory Meetings, Fall 2001.

“Empirical Consistency of General Equilibrium Models.”
Southeast Economic Theory Conference, Fall 1999; Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings, Fall 1999; General Equilibrium: Bridging Theory and Practice, Universite de Montreal, 1999; North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 1998; International Conference on Public Economic Theory, 1998.

“Common Agency in the American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB.”
American Economic Association Meeting, 1998.

“Nonparametric Testable Restrictions of Household Behavior.”

American Economic Association Meeting, 1999; Southern Economic Association Meeting, 1997; Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 1997; North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, 1997.

“Testable Restrictions of Pareto Optimal Public Good Provision.”

Midwest Mathematical Economics Meetings, 1996.

Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, 1996.

“Testable Restrictions of General Equilibrium Theory.”

15th International Symposium on Mathematical Programming, 1994.

Grants

1998-2000, Virginia Tech, “Legal Change, Social Norms, and the Married Women’s Property Acts.”

1995-1997, Virginia Tech, “The Testable Restrictions of Intra-Household Allocation Behavior.”

Teaching

Courses taught (at Virginia Tech unless otherwise noted)

Ph.D. level: Collective Choice

Undergraduate level: Public Finance, Principles of Microeconomics, Collective Decisions, Industrial Organization (Brown University)

Dissertation supervision (all Virginia Tech)

Committee member: Chiara Gratton, 2000; Cathy Johnson, 2000; Patrick Ho, 1999; Robert Bowles, 1999; Alexander Outkin, 1998; Florenz Plassman, 1997.

Service (selected)

Undergraduate advisor for economics majors, Virginia Tech, 1996-2001.

Editor of Econnews, the newsletter of the Virginia Tech economics department, 1996-2000.