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Undergraduate Studies:

B.A., Economics, University of Pennsylvania, summa cum laude, 1996
B.A.S., Systems Engineering, University of Pennsylvania, summa cum laude, 1996

Graduate Studies:

Economics, Harvard University, 2000 to present

Thesis Title: "Essays on International Trade, Technology Diffusion, and the Organization of Production"

Expected Ph.D. Completion Date: June 2006

Thesis Committee and References:

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Teaching and Research Fields:

International trade, Macroeconomics

Teaching Experience:

Spring 2003 International Trade Policy (undergraduate), Harvard University, teaching fellow for Professor Elhanan Helpman

Teaching Experience: *(continued)*

Fall 2002 & 2003	International Trade (graduate), Harvard University, grader for Professor Elhanan Helpman
2002 – present	Quincy House, Harvard University, tutor in economics

Research Experience and Other Employment:

9/2001 – present	<i>Harvard University</i> Research Assistant to Professor Robert Barro
7/2001 – 9/2001	<i>Goldman Sachs Asia</i> Summer Associate, Asia-Pacific Economics Research
7/1999 – 6/2000	<i>Council of Economic Advisers</i> Research Assistant, Macroeconomics Research & Forecasting
10/1996 – 7/1998	<i>McKinsey & Company</i> Business Analyst
6/1995 – 7/1995	<i>U.S. Department of State</i> Summer Analyst, Economics Section, U.S. Embassy in Singapore

Professional Activities

2005 - present	Referee, <i>Quarterly Journal of Economics</i>
Spring 2004	Invited presentation, NBER International Trade and Organizations Program Meeting

Honors, Scholarships, and Fellowships:

2002 – 2005	Graduate Fellowship, Bradley Foundation
2000 – 2002	Graduate Fellowship, Harvard University
1996	Bernard Shanbaum Prize for Excellence in Undergraduate Economics (top student in graduating class), University of Pennsylvania

Research Papers:

Distance, International Trade, and International Knowledge Diffusion (Job Market Paper)

In many open economy models of growth, the size and the persistence of cross-country income differences depend on the strength of international technology diffusion. While recent empirical studies find that geographic distance and language barriers impede cross-country flows of knowledge, the channels through which these effects operate are not well understood. Using patent citations as a measure of knowledge diffusion, this paper quantifies the importance of international trade as a channel for these localization effects. Unlike previous studies of trade and technology diffusion, I directly confront the issue of causality. In order to estimate the causal effect of trade on knowledge diffusion, I use the product of geographic distance and the weight-to-value ratio of each exporter's output as an instrument for bilateral imports. I find no evidence of a causal effect of trade. Accordingly, the effects of geographic and linguistic distance on knowledge diffusion appear to be essentially independent of international trade. However, given the imprecision of the estimated relationship between trade and knowledge flows, this decomposition must be interpreted with caution.

(Research Papers continue on next page)

Research Papers: *(continued)*

When Do Multinational Firms Outsource? Evidence from the Hotel Industry
(with Catherine Thomas)

Multinational firms face two questions in deciding whether or not to outsource a stage of production. First, where should production be located? Second, who should own or control the productive assets? In this paper, we test two theories of these outsourcing decisions, and we focus on their predictions for the ownership/control decision. We adapt the Antras and Helpman (2004) property rights and Grossman and Helpman (2004) managerial incentives models of the multinational firm to a setting in which a hotel headquarters chooses the size and organizational form of each of its hotel properties. The property rights model predicts a monotonic relationship between the size of a hotel and the probability that it is owned by the headquarters. In contrast, the managerial incentives model predicts an inverted-U relationship between size and the likelihood that the headquarters controls the hotel. We test these propositions using new data on the organizational form, location, and size of more than 4000 hotel properties that operate under 15 different brands in 103 countries. Four hotel brands exhibit patterns that are consistent with both models. For three other brands, organizational structures are consistent with the predictions of the managerial incentives model and inconsistent with the property rights model. These results suggest that agency problems are an important influence on the organizational choices of multinational firms. However, the relative importance of agency and holdup problems may vary substantially across brands.